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POSITIONING FAMILY PLANNING QUALITY 
WITHIN HEALTH FINANCING FOR UHC: 
CONNECTING THE DISCOURSE 
INTRODUCTION
Financing is a major challenge and concern for the future of the delivery of volun-
tary family planning (FP) services to clients, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries with high unmet need and limited method choice. As countries commit to 
universal health coverage (UHC), it is crucial that UHC schemes include FP and other 
reproductive health (RH) services. Strategic purchasing of quality FP services from 
public and private - including for profit and not-for-profit - healthcare providers could 
accelerate progress toward UHC.
It is increasingly recognized that the FP2020 goals will not be met without adequate 
attention to quality; and that a sustained focus on quality of care requires financing at 
the policy and program levels.  While the importance of sustainable financing may be 
recognized, the ‘how’ of financing for quality FP within the context of UHC is not well 
understood.
This brief targets the ‘bridge’ constituency that is coalescing between the health 
financing and FP communities of practice around a shared interest in making access 
to health services universal.  With this brief, we aim to identify opportunities for the 
FP community of practice to advocate for the inclusion of quality, voluntary, and equi-
table FP services within UHC and health financing discussions.
METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE
This technical brief drew on selected published and grey literature on quality of care, FP 
and UHC. The technical brief is divided into four sections:
• Section 1: outlines the quality and the UHC agenda, their grounding in rights,  
challenges with measurement, and how financing arrangements may affect quality 
• Section 2: outlines quality and FP, its client-oriented genesis, challenges with  
routine measurement, and efforts to analyze FP performance within financing 
arrangements
• Section 3: outlines quality and strategic purchasing for FP, using the five Ps  
analytical framework to illustrate implications for the provision of quality FP  
services
• Section 4: summarizes three important aspects of strategic purchasing for FP  
quality – the use of FP data and evidence to inform purchasing, FP quality by  
design and FP quality by implementation within purchasing schemes
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1. QUALITY AND UHC
Quality and sustainable financing of UHC are interlinked. 
Quality underpins sustainable financing as public support for 
– and the sustainability of – financing of UHC may be under-
mined by poor quality. Quality also underpins UHC as health 
services must be of high enough quality in order to improve 
health (Starrs et al, 2018). This is defined as effective cover-
age, a modified measure of population coverage, based on 
functional access to quality services (Shengelia et al, 2005). 
While some lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have 
achieved UHC, they have not achieved effective coverage.1 
In Mexico, for example, where substantial progress toward 
UHC has been achieved over time, effective or quality-cor-
rected coverage of health services remains relatively low and 
uneven across states (Lozano et al, 2006, in Akachia and 
Kruk, 2017).
UHC quality objectives are grounded in rights and  
people-centered care. Many LMICs constitutionally guarantee 
the right to health care for their citizens. Furthermore, many 
LMICs espouse integrated people-centered health services 
(IPCHS). This approach, adopted by WHO member states 
in 2016,2 is intended to provide services that are of better 
quality, are financially sustainable and more responsive to 
individuals and communities (Box 1). While aspirational 
in many contexts, IPCHS signals intent to reorient service 
delivery and health financing away from hospital-based, 
disease-based and “silo” curative care models, as these run 
counter to the provision of universal, equitable, high-quality 
and financially sustainable care (WHO, 2016). Ensuring that 
the UHC mandate is met requires backing the policy frame-
work with sustainable financing.
While quality is integral to UHC, its measurement is ‘in-
adequate to the task’ (Akachia and Kruk, 2017). Ideally 
structure, process and outcomes measures, as defined by 
Donabedian’s theory of quality (1988), would be tracked 
and linked. However, this does not tend to occur in practice. 
Partly this is due to a lack of consensus on how to measure, 
with many tools of ‘substantial variation in their content and 
comprehensiveness’ in use (Akachia and Kruk, 2017). Most 
of these address ‘structure’. ‘Process,’ such as interperson-
al care and the patient experience, and ‘outcomes’ linked 
to quality of care provided in the health system, are rarely 
measured. This is partly due to cost and the budget con-
straints under which ministries of health operate. Prioritiza-
tion of quality is also a factor, with trade-offs made between 
ensuring effective service coverage and minimum quality 
standards (Akachia and Kruk, 2017).
Financing arrangements may work at cross purposes with 
UHC quality objectives.  While health policies may set out 
explicit standards of quality, these may be mediated through 
financing arrangements, which may work at cross purposes 
to people-centered quality care. For example, these may 
influence how institutional providers (facilities and health 
systems) and individual healthcare workers provide health 
services with implications for quality (McLoughlin and 
Leatherman, 2003). Health financing arrangements may also 
generate additional costs, through the underuse, overuse, 
and misuse of interventions and services (McLoughlin and 
Leatherman, 2003).
2. QUALITY AND FP
FP, like UHC, is grounded in client rights and people-cen-
tered care. Commencing in 1994 with the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, 
the rhetoric of population control was replaced with indi-
vidual rights to dignity, sexual and reproductive health, and 
the right to plan one’s family (UNFPA, 2014). This spurred 
a sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) move-
ment that increasingly placed the user at the center of 
service delivery, with a focus on choice, equity, and quality 
as rights.  These elements feature in the Quality of Care 
Framework, first developed by Bruce (1990) and updated by 
Jain and Hardee 2018 (Box 2). The ‘Bruce-Jain’ framework, 
as it is commonly known, and the updated Jain-Hardee 
version, feature structure, process and outcome elements, 
in line with the Donabedian theory of quality. Box 2 pro-
vides a description of each of the six process elements in 
the framework. This framework, well accepted by the FP 
community, is referenced in many program settings and 
has been employed to design, develop and influence new 
models of client-centered FP. 
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1 Effective coverage is defined as the probability that someone who needs an intervention will get it and have their health improved as a result.
2 The IPCHS approach was adopted by Member States at the World Health Assembly in May 2016
BOX 1. Approach to people-centred care
“All people have equal access to quality health  
services that are co-produced in a way that meets their 
life course needs, are coordinated across the continuum 
of care, and are comprehensive, safe, effective, timely, 
efficient and acceptable; and all carers are motivated, 
skilled and operate in a supportive environment”.
Source: Framework on integrated, people-centred health 
services, page 4. WHO, 2016
33 See, for example The Collectivity https://www.thecollectivity.org/en/projects/right-based-approach.
While quality is integral to FP, there is less consensus on its 
routine measurement. There are many tools to assess the 
quality of FP services, however, there is lack of agreement 
on their routine use (Sprockett 2017). Recent studies have 
validated quality measures appropriate for routine reporting 
in FP service delivery settings, finding that higher values on 
the FP quality measures were associated with increased 
contraceptive use and reduced discontinuation (Jain et al, 
2013; Jain and Winfrey, 2017; Chakraborty et al, 2019; Jain 
et al, 2019; Holt et al, 2019). While the evidence and the 
validated metrics are promising, measurement of rights such 
as client autonomy in service delivery settings can be further 
improved (Bertrand et al, 2014; Cole et al., 2019). Where 
standard indicators from readily available data sources exist, 
there is a need to strengthen their adoption. Where standard 
indicators are lacking, new metrics are needed, to foster 
greater consensus on routine measurement of FP quality. 
There have been some recent efforts to analyze FP ‘per-
formance’ within health financing mechanisms. This has 
included systematic reviews of specific financing models, 
such as community financing and community-based health 
insurance (Karra et al, 2016), conditional and unconditional 
cash transfers (Khan et al, 2016), introducing, removing, or 
changing OOP costs or user fees (Korachais et al, 2016), 
results-based financing (Blacklock et al, 2016), perfor-
mance-based incentives (Bellows et al, 2014), and so-
cial protection programs that provide a voucher subsidy 
(Bellows et al, 2016). These studies and others have not 
specifically looked at the quality of FP provided under such 
schemes using the Bruce-Jain framework or related ele-
ments. However, out of these and other efforts, a community 
of practice and research agenda have coalesced around FP 
measurement, including aspects of client-centeredness and 
rights, within specific purchasing instruments.3      
3. QUALITY AND FP PURCHASING
There are a variety of approaches to purchasing FP 
services, each with potential implications for quality as 
outlined in the Bruce-Jain framework. When used stra-
tegically, these may enhance equity in the distribution of 
resources, increase efficiency, manage expenditure growth 
and promote quality in health service delivery (WHO, 2017). 
Strategic purchasing is intended to be an active approach, a 
‘continuous search for the best ways to maximize health 
system performance by deciding which interventions 
should be purchased, how, and from whom’ (RESYST, 
2014). Purchasing schemes, procuring on behalf of the 
FIGURE 1. Bruce-Jain FP quality of care framework
Source: Based on Jain and Hardee, 2018
BOX 2. Updated Bruce-Jain process elements of quality 
of care in FP
Choice: Be able to offer a range of contraceptive 
methods 
Information exchange: The provision of information to 
clients and the solicitation of information and preferenc-
es from clients 
Technical competence: Availability of trained providers 
competent in sterilization operation and/or in insertion 
and removal of reversible clinical methods (e.g., IUD, 
implant) as well as to ensure safety and compliance 
with infection prevention practices in delivering these 
services 
Interpersonal relations: Relations that uphold dignity, 
respect, privacy, and confidentiality 
 
Mechanisms to encourage continuity: Information 
exchange should include follow-up requirements and 
guidance on the possibility of switching the method, 
provider, or service outlet 
Appropriate constellation of services: Integration of FP 
with other RH services such as safe abortion/post-abor-
tion care; testing and treatment for sexually transmitted 
diseases, including HIV; and gender-based violence 
services 
 
Source: Based on Jain and Hardee (2018)
Program effort Impacts
Elements in the 
unit of service 
received
• Policy/political 
    support
• Choice • Client knowledge
• Client satisfaction
• Client health
• Service use
• Information 
    exchange
• Technical 
    competence
• Interpersonal 
    relations
• Mechanisms to
    encourage  
    continuity
• Appropriate
    constellation of 
    services
• Resources 
    allocated
• Program
   management/
   structure
4TABLE 1. 5P and Bruce-Jain frameworks for FP
Purchasing domains Purchasing elements FP considerations Bruce and Jain 
framework
Polities: Why to  
purchase (rationale 
and institutional  
arrangements) 
• Political commitment
• Institutional arrange-
ments
• Purchaser alignment 
(across mechanisms)
• Monitoring and ac-
countability
• Performance  
management
• Societal benefits 
(SRHR, gender equality, 
public health impact)
• Economic benefits 
(women’s participation 
in the labor force and  
demographic dividend) 
• Normative environment 
and ability to realize 
rights for FP 
• Stewardship and  
ownership (e.g.  
government and  
donors, central and 
decentralized)
• Fragmentation and 
adequacy of financing 
(horizontal and vertical 
coherence)
• Policy/political  
support
• Resource  
allocated 
• Program  
management/  
structure
People: For whom to 
purchase
• Defined target  
clientele
• Clientele awareness
• Community and  
society engagement
• Unmet need 
• Equity (e.g. poor  
women and men,  
adolescents)
• Client continued use 
(through method 
choice)
• Financial barriers/ 
out-of-pocket 
expenditure
Package: What to  
purchase
• Defined benefit  
objectives 
• Defined benefit 
package 
• Broad method mix to 
improve choice, enable 
switching, and reduce 
discontinuation
• FP integration into 
RMNCAH continuum/
packages
• Choice of  
methods
• Appropriate 
constellation of 
services
Provider: From whom to 
purchase
• Contracting
• Accreditation
• Integration (e.g. of 
public and private 
providers)
• Physical access/choice 
of outlet
• Minimum quality  
standards
• Integration of the  
private sector 
• Client realization of FP 
rights
• Technical  
competence
• Information given 
to clients
• Interpersonal 
relations
• Follow up/ 
continuity 
mechanisms
Payment: How to  
purchase
• Payment rates
• Payment methods
• Provider autonomy 
• Claims processing
• Quality assurance 
(data and clinical)
• Likelihood of being 
offered choice of FP 
method (e.g. provider 
behavior)
• Efficiency and quality
• Regulatory and public 
financial management 
health system, may include national health insurance, 
voucher programs, results-based financing and input-based 
budgets or a combination thereof. To illustrate how pur-
chasing elements may support or constrain FP quality, the 
5P framework (Appleford and RamRao, 2018) (Table 1) 
has been overlaid to the Bruce-Jain framework.  Following 
the table, we describe how the different elements of FP 
purchasing may influence quality of care with particular 
focus on “for whom to purchase”, “what to purchase”, “from 
whom to purchase” and “how to purchase.”
People: for whom to purchase
For whom to purchase has implications for FP access. 
These considerations do not feature explicitly in the Bruce-
Jain framework but are reflected in ‘program effort’ (see 
Figure 1), if this is directed towards equity of access. Prog-
ress toward UHC is intended to remove financial barriers 
to access to quality health services. However, FP financial 
barriers for women and girls may not be recognized or 
prioritized within UHC schemes, even by the FP community, 
given other supply- and demand-side barriers (Lie et al, 
2015). It is estimated that out-of-pocket (OOP) payments 
comprise nearly half (49%) of the costs of reproductive, ma-
ternal, neonatal, and children’s healthcare (Lie et al, 2015) 
and will account for most of the financing for FP products 
over the next three years (RHSC, 2018). Financing through 
OOP for FP may not be viewed as catastrophic or a financial 
hardship for women and girls but may result in unplanned 
pregnancy and recourse to unsafe abortion, with potentially 
catastrophic consequences for the individual and her fami-
ly; furthermore the health system will bear costs due to the 
management of mistimed or unintended pregnancies. 
FP choice may reflect price rather than preference. This 
extends to decisions to seek FP services, from whom, 
and what methods to use. A study by Ugaz et al (2016) 
found that, in 17 of 30 countries, a greater proportion of 
poorer women used short-acting methods over long-acting 
methods than wealthier women, suggesting that financial 
barriers may suppress choice. For adolescents, cost may 
deter them from accessing health services altogether, more 
so than adults. This may be due to their limited capacity 
to access services independent of their parents, and their 
limited access to cash, either their own or that of their 
family (Waddington and Sambo, 2015). The WHO global 
consultation on adolescents indicated that very few (6%) 
adolescents pay OOP for health services with many (45%) 
reporting that their parents and/or family members were 
the principal payers of their healthcare costs (WHO, 2019), 
which are unlikely to include FP or other SRH services. 
When financial barriers are removed, an individual may be 
able to act upon their preference to both seek and choose 
a FP method. However, it is recognised that other barriers 
may exist and intersect with financial ones.
Package: what to purchase
What to purchase has implications for FP choice and 
an appropriate constellation of services. While govern-
ments often prioritize essential health services in benefits 
packages, this does not always include FP. Research by 
Eldridge and Appleford (2016) found that only six of 14 
government-sponsored health insurance schemes in USAID 
FP priority countries included FP in their benefit package 
(no information was provided on constellation of services). 
Service exemption schemes for maternal and child health 
(MCH), such as those in Sahelian countries, may also fail 
to include FP as part of a continuum of care (Appleford and 
Camara, 2018; Mazzilli et al, 2016). Even when FP is in-
cluded in a benefits package or service exemption scheme, 
this may not translate to provision. A seven-country study 
of health insurance schemes (Ross et al, 2018) conclud-
ed that despite the formal inclusion of FP services in the 
national benefits packages examined, actual integration of 
these services faced challenges, with implications for the 
availability of FP services in practice. A study in India also 
found that use of FP under the national health insurance 
scheme was low, estimated at 2%, with poorer families less 
likely to know of its inclusion (Mozumdar et al, 2019).
The FP community may conflate FP inclusion in benefits 
packages with choice. However, this may not account for 
user preference in outlets or differential requirements of 
FP methods. For example, non-clinical outlets, such as 
pharmacies or shops may be preferred by some users, who 
desire methods, such as condoms and emergency con-
traception, that does not require visiting a medical facility 
(Bertrand et al, 2014) and prefer a more anonymized, less 
interpersonal transaction. Long-acting reversible contra-
ception (LARCs) on the other hand may benefit from explicit 
inclusion in a benefits package, given that these methods 
require a clinical setting and have additional competency 
and consumable requirements for their delivery. These 
differences may not be reflected within the global FP com-
munity, which may advocate for equal treatment of all FP 
methods within benefits packages, without a more nuanced 
view of requirements.
Payment: how to purchase
How to purchase within UHC schemes has implications for 
service quality. This is an important determinant of whether 
and how well services are provided. This includes more 
observable quality measures, such as technical compe-
tence and follow up/continuity mechanisms, as well as less 
observable quality measures such as interactions related to 
information given to clients and interpersonal relations.
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Payment mechanisms can influence the extent to which 
individuals can genuinely choose the FP method of their 
choice (Holtz and Sarker, 2018). Increasingly, LMICs are 
experimenting with different payment approaches and may 
blend two or more payment mechanisms For example, in 
Kenya, FP is included under capitation for short-term and 
long-acting methods and under fee-for-service for perma-
nent methods within the National Hospital Insurance Fund 
(NHIF). The NHIF is implemented in public facilities where 
line item budgets cater for FP inputs such as health worker 
time and commodities and private facilities where there is 
no budget support.
A selection of payment mechanisms is featured to demon-
strate their potential influence on FP quality. However, ide-
ally performance of individual payment mechanisms would 
be considered holistically in a mixed provider payment 
system (McIsaac, 2018).
Line item budgets 
Family planning services have historically been financed 
using input-based methods. These input-based methods 
use a salary schedule for individual healthcare providers, 
based on their cadre, qualifications, and other factors. If 
providers are compensated regardless of service volume, 
they are free to spend as much time as needed with each 
patient and to tailor their services to the needs of the 
individual, potentially optimizing the information exchange. 
However, lacking any incentive toward service provision and 
quality, unmotivated providers may feel disinclined to offer 
complicated or expensive methods or procedures, such as 
LARCs or permanent methods.
Fee for service
Fee-for-service payments may create diverse financial 
incentives for providers to deliver “more, less, or different 
services” (Holtz and Sarker, 2018). Fee-for-service may be 
the most precise way to pay for actual services and can 
be used to encourage delivery of priority services (Holtz 
and Sarker, 2018). This may have the opposite effect of 
input-based payments, such as a health worker salary, and 
influence providers to perform services that require greater 
clinical skills, consumables and counseling. While this form 
of payment may improve the offer of LARCs and permanent 
methods, there are concerns within the FP community that 
this may result in over provision. However, a best practice 
guidance suggests that differential payment of FP methods 
such as LARCs is appropriate, if this is in line with reim-
bursement rates for other services (Eichler, 2018).
Results-based payments
Results- and performance-based financing (PBF)4 is  
purchasing of health services linked to a goal or result. 
When goals are linked to quality, efficiency, or positive 
health outcomes, this may be a strategy for improving qual-
ity of services, although evidence of its impact on quality is 
inconclusive (Akachia and Kruk, 2017). If goals are linked 
to quantity of services provided, this may disincentivize 
quality by emphasizing the numbers of clients served with 
FP. In practice, many of these payment mechanisms have a 
quantity-based result and a quality-based modifier (Cole et 
al, 2019). A recent multi-country review (Cole et al, 2019) 
sought to map the extent to which PBF reflected quality, 
informed choice and volunteerism, using the principles of 
the Bruce-Jain framework. This review found 452 FP-related 
indicators used in PBF schemes, 57 quantity-based perfor-
mance indicators and 395 questions to assess the quality 
of FP services (Cole et al, 2019). The review concluded that 
rights elements were not uniformly represented and a more 
systematic approach to rights-based implementation of FP 
services in PBF programs is needed.
Specific indicators, such as new users, may also run count-
er to Bruce-Jain quality elements. Many PBF schemes count 
new FP users as a primary measure. However, this measure 
can have multiple definitions including first-time user, new 
to the provider (e.g., provider-changer), new to the method 
(e.g., switching methods), not recently using a method (e.g., 
lapsed user), and even additional user (Dasgupta et al. 
2017). Irrespective of definition, a focus on new users has 
been associated with less diverse method mix, greater pro-
vider bias, or more frequent commodity stock-outs and may 
reflect users having limited information and fewer options 
(RamaRao and Jain 2015). PBF schemes may also focus on 
method-specific indicators, linked with higher-level impact 
measures such as the relative effectiveness of specific 
methods or a desire to remove price as a barrier to consumer 
choice (Cole et al, 2019). This may be an important PBF 
objective in contexts where there is low overall utilization of 
modern FP, high reliance on short-term methods, such as 
condoms, and financial barriers to method choice such as 
LARCs. 
6
4 Performance-based financing (PBF) programs are considered a specific subset of RBF initiatives and are distinguished by a focus on monetary incentives to healthcare  
   providers for achieving agreed performance measure under certain conditions.
Capitation
Capitation is a payment arrangement for health care 
service providers that pays a set amount for each enrolled 
person assigned to them, per period of time, whether or 
not that person seeks care. It is a form of payment that 
places the provider, and not the purchaser, at risk for the 
amount and quality of services used (Holtz and Sarker, 
2018). As a prospective payment made to providers on a 
per-person, per period basis for a defined set of services, 
capitation is thought to create better alignment of financial 
incentives between healthcare purchasers and providers. 
It is well suited to pay for predictable and commonly used 
services. It is less well suited for the full range of FP services 
unless this is explicitly rewarded. This mode of payment forc-
es providers and facilities to work within a budget, which 
can incentivize more efficient care, prioritizing those with 
the greatest needs. However, this also may influence facili-
ties to effectively ration quality, by minimizing the expense 
spent on each patient/client. Given this, the rate of capita-
tion matters to quality - in theory, the higher the rate, the 
more likely a provider receives sufficient revenue to provide 
needed services, with good quality. Conversely, a low rate of 
capitation may compromise quality. 
Capitation may act as a disincentive for the provision of  
resource-intensive FP methods. When considering a volun-
tary service such as FP that is predominantly used by  
women, a provider could attract a mix of patients who 
use many FP services, yet receives the same capitation 
payment as another provider who provides few or no FP 
services. Additionally, if FP services are included in a cap-
itation payment for a set of PHC services, all other things 
held equal, providers would have a financial incentive to 
provide short-acting methods since those methods are the 
most efficient (e.g. quick and cheap) to provide. This is one 
argument for “carving out” FP from capitation payments 
for primary care and paying for it on a fee-for-service basis 
(whether with case rates or at the service level).
Provider: from whom to purchase
‘Healthy competition’ through client choice of provider is 
also an important aspect of quality. This may allow wom-
en and couples to select providers that have higher client 
perceptions of quality, such as short waiting times or more 
informative and interpersonal interactions with clients. 
While choice of provider is not explicit in the Bruce-Jain 
framework, it is implicit in framework impacts as it may be 
associated with greater client satisfaction, acceptance and 
continuation of contraception. According to a recent study, 
the private sector provides 37% of FP services globally, 
making a significant contribution to access; of this share, 
over half (54%) of FP services are provided by medical pro-
viders, 36% by specialized drug sellers, and 6% by retailers 
(Campbell et al, 2015 in Holtz and Sarker, 2018). Wom-
en also select providers based on OOP cost; clients may 
choose a private provider for short-term methods that are 
more affordable but seek more expensive methods such as 
LAPM from public providers, where the service may be free 
or nearly free for the consumer (Ugaz et al. 2013).
4. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER
Service quality should inform resource allocation decisions 
and strategic purchasing arrangements. This should be 
supported by available data and evidence, even though 
not all FP quality elements from the Bruce-Jain framework 
may be represented. Some process quality elements, such 
as interpersonal care and client experience, are difficult to 
routinely measure, and thwart quality measurement in UHC 
more broadly. Given this, effort may be better placed on a 
normative environment for FP quality and rights evidenced 
through political commitment, national stewardship and 
ownership of FP programs (this equates to ‘program effort’ 
in the Bruce-Jain framework). Situating FP service quality 
within broader efforts to achieve and measure effective 
coverage of UHC is recommended.
The FP community should advocate for FP ‘quality by 
design’ within purchasing strategies. This would shift 
attention to the design of purchasing strategies and their 
effects on FP process elements in the Bruce-Jain frame-
work. At present, FP quality is addressed as service units in 
the Bruce-Jain framework, and may benefit from a broader 
systems lens. Quality by design could include use of pur-
chasing metrics that reduce risk of missed opportunities 
and promote the inclusion of quality FP within a continuum 
of care. For example, FP could be rewarded within ante-
natal and postnatal care as part of a quality modifier to 
PBF schemes. This would better align with UHC quality and 
health systems objectives of integrated people-centered 
care.
The FP community should ensure that purchasing strat-
egies support a client-oriented or rights-based approach 
to high quality services. The quality of FP services is 
determined by measuring service inputs, processes and 
outcomes. FP purchasing strategies may incentivize high 
quality but still fail to strengthen a rights-based approach. 
Implementing FP purchasing strategies from a rights-based 
perspective asks which policies will help to make the FP 
service universally accessible, acceptable, and available. 
Regardless of the purchasing strategy selected in a given 
context, the FP community of practice has an obligation to 
ensure that the purchasing strategy supports a rights-based 
approach to high quality FP services. 
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